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NOTES  AND  COMMENTS 
RISK AVERSION  AND  EXPECTED-UTILITY  THEORY: 
A  CALIBRATION  THEOREM 
BY  MATTHEW RABIN1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
USING  EXPECTED-UTILITY  THEORY, economists  model  risk  aversion  as  arising  solely 
because  the utility function over wealth is concave. This diminishing-marginal-utility-of- 
wealth theory of risk aversion is psychologically intuitive, and surely helps explain some 
of our aversion to large-scale risk: We dislike vast uncertainty in lifetime wealth because 
a dollar that helps us avoid poverty is more valuable than a dollar that helps us become 
very rich. 
Yet this theory also implies that people are approximately risk neutral when stakes are 
small. Arrow (1971, p. 100) shows that an expected-utility maximizer with a differentiable 
utility  function  will  always want  to  take  a  sufficiently  small  stake  in  any  positive- 
expected-value bet. That is, expected-utility maximizers are (almost everywhere) arbitrar- 
ily  close  to  risk  neutral  when  stakes  are  arbitrarily small.  While  most  economists 
understand this formal limit result, fewer appreciate that the approximate risk-neutrality 
prediction  holds  not just  for  negligible  stakes,  but  for  quite  sizable  and economically 
important stakes. Economists  often  invoke expected-utility theory to explain substantial 
(observed or posited) risk aversion over stakes where the theory actually predicts virtual 
risk neutrality. 
While  not  broadly appreciated,  the  inability of  expected-utility  theory  to  provide a 
plausible account of risk aversion over modest  stakes has become  oral tradition among 
some subsets of researchers, and has been  illustrated in writing in a variety of different 
contexts using standard utility functions.2 In this paper, I reinforce this previous research 
by presenting a theorem that calibrates a relationship between  risk attitudes over small 
and large stakes. The theorem shows that, within the expected-utility model, anything but 
virtual risk neutrality over modest stakes implies manifestly unrealistic risk aversion over 
1 Many people,  including  David  Bowman,  Colin  Camerer,  Eddie  Dekel,  Larry Epstein,  Erik 
Eyster, Mitch Polinsky, Drazen Prelec, Richard Thaler, and Roberto  Weber, as well as a co-editor 
and two anonymous referees,  have provided useful  feedback on  this paper. I thank Jimmy Chan, 
Erik Eyster, Roberto  Weber, and especially  Steven  Blatt for research assistance,  and the  Russell 
Sage, MacArthur, National Science (Award 9709485), and Sloan Foundations for financial support. I 
also  thank  the  Center  for  Advanced  Studies  in  Behavioral  Sciences,  supported  by  NSF  Grant 
SBR-960123, where an earlier draft of the paper was written. 
2 See  Epstein  (1992), Epstein  and Zin  (1990),  Hansson  (1988),  Kandel and  Stambaugh (1991), 
Loomes  and Segal (1994), and Segal and Spivak (1990). Hansson's (1988) discussion is most similar 
to the  themes  raised in this paper. He  illustrates how a person who for all initial wealth levels is 
exactly indifferent  between  gaining  $7  for  sure  and  a  50-50  gamble  of  gaining  either  $0 or  $21 
prefers a sure gain of $7 to  any lottery where the  chance of gaining positive amounts of money is 
less than 40%-no  matter how large the potential gain is. 
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large  stakes.  The theorem  is entirely  "nonparametric,"  assuming  nothing  about  the utility 
function  except concavity. 
In the next section I illustrate  implications  of the theorem  with examples  of the form 
"If an expected-utility  maximizer  always  turns down modest-stakes  gamble X, she will 
always  turn down large-stakes  gamble Y."  Suppose  that, from any initial  wealth level, a 
person turns down gambles where she  loses  $100 or gains $110, each with 50% 
probability.  Then she will turn down 50-50 bets of losing $1,000 or gaining any sum of 
money.  A person  who would always  turn down  50-50  lose $1,000/gain $1,050  bets would 
always  turn  down  50-50  bets of losing $20,000  or gaining  any sum.  These are implausible 
degrees  of risk aversion.  The theorem  not only yields implications  if we know  somebody 
will turn down a bet for all initial  wealth levels. Suppose  we knew a risk-averse  person 
turns down 50-50 lose $100/gain $105 bets for any lifetime wealth level less than 
$350,000,  but knew  nothing  about  the degree of her risk aversion  for wealth  levels above 
$350,000.  Then  we know  that from an initial  wealth  level of $340,000  the person  will turn 
down  a 50-50 bet of losing $4,000  and gaining  $635,670. 
The intuition for such examples, and for the  theorem itself, is  that within the 
expected-utility  framework,  turning  down  a modest-stakes  gamble  means  that the marginal 
utility  of money  must diminish  very quickly  for small changes  in wealth.  For instance,  if 
you reject a 50-50 lose $10/gain $11 gamble  because of diminishing  marginal  utility,  it 
must  be that you value the eleventh  dollar  above  your  current  wealth  by at most (10/11) 
as much as you valued the tenth-to-last-dollar  of your current  wealth.3 Iterating  this 
observation,  if you have the same aversion  to the lose $10/gain $11 bet if you were $21 
wealthier, you value the thirty-second  dollar above your current wealth by at most 
(10/11) x (10/11);  (5/6)  as much as your tenth-to-last  dollar. You will value your 
two-hundred-twentieth  dollar by at most (3/20)  as much as your last dollar, and your 
eight-hundred-eightieth  dollar  by at most (1/2,000) of your last dollar.  This is an absurd 
rate for the value of  money to  deteriorate-and  the  theorem shows the  rate of 
deterioration  implied  by expected-utility  theory  is actually  quicker  than this. Indeed,  the 
theorem  is really  just an algebraic  articulation  of how implausible  it is that the consump- 
tion value  of a dollar  changes  significantly  as a function  of whether  your  lifetime  wealth  is 
$10, $100, or even $1,000  higher or lower. From such observations  we should conclude 
that aversion  to modest-stakes  risk  has nothing  to do with the diminishing  marginal  utility 
of wealth. 
Expected-utility  theory  seems to be a useful and adequate  model of risk aversion  for 
many purposes,  and it is especially  attractive  in lieu of an equally  tractable  alternative 
model. "Extremely-concave  expected  utility"  may even be useful as a parsimonious  tool 
for modeling  aversion  to modest-scale  risk.  But this and previous  papers  make clear that 
expected-utility  theory is manifestly  not close to the right explanation  of risk attitudes 
over modest stakes. Moreover,  when the specific  structure  of expected-utility  theory is 
used to analyze  situations  involving  modest  stakes-such  as in research  that assumes  that 
large-stake and modest-stake risk attitudes derive from the  same utility-for-wealth 
3My wording  here, as in the opening  paragraph  and elsewhere,  gives a psychological  interpreta- 
tion to the concavity  of the utility function. Yet a referee has reminded  me that a common 
perspective  among  economists  studying  choice under  uncertainty  has been that the concavity  of the 
utility function need be given no psychological interpretation. I add such a psychological interpreta- 
tion  throughout the  paper as an aid to  those  readers who, like  me,  find this  approach to  be  the 
natural way to  think about utility theory, but of  course  the  mathematical  results  and behavioral 
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function-it  can be very  misleading.  In the concluding  section, I discuss  a few examples 
of such research  where the expected-utility  hypothesis  is detrimentally  maintained,  and 
speculate very briefly on what set of ingredients  may be needed to provide a better 
account of risk attitudes.  In the next section, I discuss the theorem and illustrate  its 
implications. 
2.  SOME  CALIBRATIONS  BASED  ON  A  THEOREM 
Consider  an expected-utility  maximizer  over wealth, w, with Von Neumann-Morgen- 
stern preferences  U(w). Assume that the person likes money and is risk-averse:  For all 
w,U(w)  is (strictly)  increasing  and (weakly)  concave.  Suppose  further  that,  for some range 
of initial  wealth  levels and for some g > 1  > 0, she will reject  bets losing $1 or gaining  $g, 
each with 50% chance.4 From the assumption  that these bets will be rejected, the 
theorem presented in this paper places an upper bound on the rate at which utility 
increases above a given wealth level, and a lower bound on the rate at which utility 
decreases  below that wealth level. Its proof is a short series of algebraic  manipulations; 
both the theorem  and proof are in the Appendix.  Its basic intuition  is straightforward,  as 
described  briefly  in the introduction. 
The theorem  handles  cases where  we know  a person  to be averse  to a gamble  only  for 
some ranges  of initial  wealth.  A simpler  corollary,  also in the Appendix,  holds when we 
know  a lower  bound  on risk  aversion  for all wealth  levels.  Table I illustrates  some of the 
corollary's  \implications:  Consider  an individual  who is known to reject, for all initial 
wealth  levels, 50-50,  lose $100/gain g bets, for g = $101,  $105,  $110,  and $125.  The table 
presents  implications  of the form "the person  will turn down  50-50 gambles  of losing L 
and gaining  G,"  where each L is a row  in the table and the highest G (using  the bounds 
established  by the corollary)  making  the statement true is the entry in the table.5  All 
entries are rounded  down  to an even dollar  amount. 
So, for instance,  if a person always  turns down a 50-50 lose $100/gain $110 gamble, 
she will always  turn  down  a 50-50  lose $800/gain $2,090  gamble.  Entries  of co  are literal: 
Somebody  who always  turns  down  50-50  lose $100/gain $125  gambles  will turn  down any 
gamble  with a 50%  chance  of losing $600.  This is because  the fact that the bound  on risk 
aversion  holds everywhere  implies  that U(w) is bounded  above. 
4 The assumption that U is concave is not implied by the fact that an agent always turns down a 
given better-than-fair bet; if you know that a person always turns down 50-50 lose $10/gain  $11 bets, 
you  don't  know that  her  utility  function  is  concave  everywhere-it  could  be  convex  over  small 
ranges. (For instance, let  U(w) = 1 -  (W)W  for w q (19, 20), but 
Uw  =1(-  ()  +  [  -  (2  -  19) 
for  w e  (19,20).)  Concavity  is  an  additional  assumption,  but  I  am  confident  that  results  hold 
approximately if we allow such small and silly nonconvexities. 
5 The  theorem  provides a  lower bound  on  the  concavity of  the  utility function,  and its  proof 
indicates  an  obvious  way to  obtain  a  stronger (but  uglier)  result.  Also,  while  the  theorem  and 
applications focus on "50-50 bets," the point is applicable to more general bets. For instance, if an 
expected-utility maximizer dislikes a bet with a 25% chance  of losing  $100 and a 75% chance  of 
winning $100, then  she would turn down 50-50 lose  $100/gain  $300 bets, and we could apply the 
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TABLE I 
IF AVERSE  TO 50-50  LOSE  $100/GAIN  g  BETS  FOR ALL WEALTH  LEVELS, 
WILL  TURN  DOWN  50-50  LOSE  L /  GAIN  G  BETS;  G'S  ENTERED  IN TABLE. 
g 
L  $101  $105  $110  $125 
$400  400  420  550  1,250 
$600  600  730  990  OO 
$800  800  1,050  2,090  OO 
$1,000  1,010  1,570  00  OO 
$2,000  2,320  00  00  00 
$4,000  5,750  00  00  00 
$6,000  11,810  00  00  00 
$8,000  34,940  OO  00  OO 
$10,000  OO  OO 
$20,000  OO  OO 
The  theorem  and corollary are homogeneous  of  degree  1: If we  know that  turning 
down 50-50 lose  i/gain  g gambles implies you will turn down 50-50 lose L/gain  G, then 
for all  x > 0, turning down 50-50 lose  xl/gain  xg  gambles implies you will turn down 
50-50 lose  xL/gain  xG. Hence  the  L = $10,000, g = $101 entry in Table I tells us that 
turning down 50-50 lose  $10/gain  $10.10 gambles implies you will turn down 50-50 lose 
$1,000/gain  co gambles. 
The reader may worry that the extreme risk aversion shown in Table I relies heavily on 
the  assumption that the  person will turn down the  given gamble for  all  initial wealth 
levels. It doesn't. While without knowing a global lower bound on a person's modest-stakes 
risk aversion we cannot assert that she'll turn down gambles with infinite expected return, 
Table  II indicates  that  the  lack of  a lower bound  does  not  salvage the  plausibility of 
expected-utility theory. Table II shows calibrations if we know the person will turn down 
50-50 lose  $100/gain  g  gambles for initial wealth  levels  less  than $300,000, indicating 
which  gambles  she'll  turn  down  starting from  initial  wealth  level  of  $290,000.  Large 
entries are approximate. 
TABLE II 
TABLE  I  REPLICATED,  FOR  INITIAL  WEALTH  LEVEL  $290,000, 
WHEN  l/g  BEHAVIOR  IS ONLY  KNOWN  TO HOLD  FOR W <  $300,000. 
L  $101  $105  $110  $125 
$400  400  420  550  1,250 
$600  600  730  990  36,000,000,000 
$800  800  1,050  2,090  90,000,000,000 
$1,000  1,010  1,570  718,190  160,000,000,000 
$2,000  2,320  69,930  12,210,880  850,000,000,000 
$4,000  5,750  635,670  60,528,930  9,400,000,000,000 
$6,000  11,510  1,557,360  180,000,000  89,000,000,000,000 
$8,000  19,290  3,058,540  510,000,000  830,000,000,000,000 
$10,000  27,780  5,503,790  1,300,000,000  7,700,000,000,000,000 
$20,000  85,750  71,799,110  160,000,000,000  540,000,000,000,000,000,000 RISK AVERSION  1285 
TABLE III 
IF A PERSON  HAS CARA  UTILITY  FUNCTION  AND  Is AVERSE  TO 50/50  LOSE  $1 /  GAIN  $g  BETS  FOR 
ALL WEALTH  LEVELS,  THEN  (i)  SHE  HAS  COEFFICIENT  OF ABSOLUTE  RISK  AVERSION  No  SMALLER 
THAN  p AND  (ii)  INVESTS  $X  IN THE  STOCK  MARKET  WHEN  STOCK  YIELDS  ARE  NORMALLY 
DISTRIBUTED  WITH MEAN  REAL  RETURN  6.4%  AND  STANDARD  DEVIATION  20%,  AND  BONDS 
YIELD  A RISKLESS  RETURN  OF 0.5%. 
l/g  p  X 
$100/$101  .0000990  $14,899 
$100/$105  .0004760  $3,099 
$100/$110  .0009084  $1,639 
$100/$125  .0019917  $741 
$100/$150  .0032886  $449 
$1,000/$1,050  .0000476  $30,987 
$1,000/$1,100  .0000908  $16,389 
$1,000/$1,200  .0001662  $8,886 
$1,000/$1,500  .0003288  $4,497 
$1,000/$2,000  .0004812  $3,067 
$10,000/$11,000  .0000090  $163,889 
$10,000/$12,000  .0000166  $88,855 
$10,000/$15,000  .0000328  $44,970 
$10,000/$20,000  .0000481  $30,665 
If we only know that a person turns down 50-50 lose  $100/gain  $125 bets when her 
lifetime  wealth  is  below  $300,000,  we  also  know  she  will  turn  down  a  50-50  lose 
$600/gain  $36 billion bet  beginning from lifetime  $290,000.6 The  intuition  is that the 
extreme concavity of the utility function between $290,000 and $300,000 assures that the 
marginal utility at $300,000 is tiny compared to the marginal utility at wealth levels below 
$290,000; hence,  even if the marginal utility does  not diminish at all above $300,000, a 
person  will not  care  nearly  as  much  about  money  above  $300,000  as  she  does  about 
amounts below $290,000. The  choice  of  $290,000 and $300,000 as the  two focal wealth 
levels is arbitrary;  all that matters is that they are $10,000 apart. As with Table I, Table II 
is homogeneous  of  degree  1, where  the wedge  between  the  two wealth levels  must be 
multiplied by the same factor as the other entries. Hence-multiplying  Table II by 10-if 
an expected-utility maximizer would turn down a 50-50 lose  $1,000/gain  $1,050 gamble 
whenever  her  lifetime  wealth  is  below  $300,000,  then  from  an  initial wealth  level  of 
$200,000 she will turn down a 50-50 lose $40,000/gain  $6,356,700 gamble. 
While these  "nonparametric" calibrations are less conducive to analyzing more com- 
plex questions, Table  III provides similar calibrations for decisions  that resemble  real- 
world investment choices by assuming conventional functional forms of utility functions. 
It shows what aversion to various gambles implies for the maximum amount of money a 
person with a constant-absolute-risk-aversion (CARA) utility function would be willing to 
6 Careful examination of Tables I and II shows that most entries that are not oo  in Table I show 
up exactly the same in Table II. The two exceptions are those entries that are above $10,000-since 
Table II implicitly makes no assumptions about concavity for gains of more than $10,000, it yields 
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keep invested  in the stock market,  for reasonable  assumptions  about the distribution  of 
returns  for stocks and bonds. Hence, an expected-utility  maximizer  with CARA prefer- 
ences who turns  down  50/50 lose $1,000/gain $1,200  gambles  will only  be willing  to keep 
$8,875  of her portfolio  in the stock market,  no matter  how large her total investments  in 
stocks and bonds.  If she turns  down  a 50/50 lose $100/gain $110 bet, she will be willing 
to keep only $1,600 of her portfolio in the stock market-keeping the rest in bonds 
(which  average  6%  lower  annual  return).  While  it is widely  believed  that investors  are too 
cautious  in their investment  behavior,  no one believes they are this risk averse. 
3.  DISCUSSION  AND  CONCLUSION 
Expected-utility  theory may well be a useful model of the taste for very-large-scale 
insurance.7  Despite its usefulness,  however,  there are reasons why it is important  for 
economists  to recognize  how miscalibrated  expected-utility  theory  is as an explanation  of 
modest-scale  risk aversion.  For instance, some research  methods economists  currently 
employ  should  be abandoned  because  they rely crucially  on the expected-utility  interpre- 
tation of modest-scale  risk aversion.  One example  arises in experimental  economics.  In 
recent  years,  there has been extensive  laboratory  research  in economics  in which  subjects 
interact  to generate outcomes  with payoffs  on the order of $10 to $20. Researchers  are 
often interested  in inferring  subjects'  beliefs from  their  behavior.  Doing so often requires 
knowing  the relative  value subjects  hold for different  money  prizes;  if a person chooses 
$5 in event A over $10 in event B, we know  that she believes A is at least twice as likely 
as B  only if we can assume the person likes $10 at least twice as much as $5. Yet 
economic theory tells us that, because of diminishing  marginal  utility of wealth, we 
should not assume people like $10 exactly  twice as much as $5. Experimentalists  (e.g., 
Davis and Holt (1993, pp. 472-476)) have developed a clever scheme to  avoid this 
problem:  Instead  of prizes  of $10 and $5, subjects  are given  prizes  such as 10%  chance  of 
winning $100 vs. 5% chance of winning $100. Expected-utility  theory tells us that, 
irrespective  of the utility function, a subject  values the 10% chance of a prize exactly 
twice as much as the 5% chance of winning  the same prize. 
The problem  with this lottery  procedure  is that it is known  to be sufficient  only  when 
we  maintain the  expected-utility  hypothesis. But  then  it  is  not  necessary-since 
expected-utility  theory  tells us that people  will be virtually  risk  neutral  in decisions  on the 
scale of laboratory  stakes.  If expected-utility  theory  is right,  these procedures  are at best 
redundant,  and are probably  harmful.8  On the other hand, if we think that subjects  in 
experiments  are risk averse, then we know they are not expected-utility  maximizers. 
Hence the  lottery procedure,  which is  motivated solely by expected-utility  theory's 
assumptions  that preferences  are linear  in probabilities  and that risk  attitudes  come only 
7While  there is also much evidence  for some limits of its applicability  for large-scale  risks,  and 
the results of this paper suggest an important  flaw with the expected-utility  model, the specific 
results  do not of course  demonstrate  that the model is unuseful  in all domains. 
8 If expected-utility theory explained behavior, these  procedures would surely not be worth the 
extra expense, nor the loss in reliability of the data from making experiments more complicated. Nor 
should  experimentalists who  believe  in  expected-utility  theory  ever be  cautious  about  inferences 
made from existing experiments that don't use the lottery methods out of fear that the results are 
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from the curvature  of  the utility-of-wealth  function, has little presumptive  value in 
"neutralizing"  risk aversion.  Perhaps  there are theories of risk attitudes  such that the 
lottery  procedure  is useful  for neutralizing  risk  aversion-but expected-utility  theory  isn't 
one of them.9 
A second example  of problematic  research  methods  relates  to the logic underlying  the 
theorem: Expected-utility  theory makes wrong predictions  about the relationship  be- 
tween risk aversion  over modest  stakes and risk aversion  over large stakes.  Hence, when 
measuring  risk attitudes  maintaining  the expected-utility  hypothesis,  differences  in esti- 
mates of risk attitudes  may come from differences  in the scale of risk comprising  data 
sets, rather  than from differences  in risk attitudes  of the people being studied.10  Data 
sets dominated  by modest-risk  investment  opportunities  are likely to yield much higher 
estimates  of risk  aversion  than data  sets dominated  by larger-scale  investment  opportuni- 
ties. So not only are standard  measures  of risk  aversion  somewhat  hard  to interpret  given 
that people are not expected-utility  maximizers,  but even attempts to compare risk 
attitudes  so as to compare  across groups  will be misleading  unless economists  pay due 
attention  to the theory's  calibrational  problems. 
The problems  with assuming  that risk attitudes  over modest and large stakes derive 
from the same utility-of-wealth  function  relate to a long-standing  debate in economics. 
Expected-utility  theory makes a powerful  prediction  that economic actors don't see an 
amalgamation  of independent  gambles  as significant  insurance  against  the risk of those 
gambles;  they are either barely  less willing or barely  more willing  to accept risks  when 
clumped  together  than when apart.  This observation  was introduced  in a famous  article 
by Samue,lson  (1963),  who showed  that expected-utility  theory implies that if (for some 
sufficiently  wide range of initial  wealth levels) a person turns  down a particular  gamble, 
then she should also turn down an offer to play n > 1 of those gambles.  Hence, in his 
example,  if Samuelson's  colleague is unwilling  to accept a 50-50 lose $100/gain $200 
gamble, then he should be unwilling  to accept 100 of those gambles taken together. 
Though  Samuelson's  theorem  is "weaker"  than the one in this paper,  it makes manifest 
the fact that expected-utility  theory predicts  that adding  together a lot of independent 
risks  should  not appreciably  alter attitudes  towards  those risks. 
9Indeed,  the  observation that diminishing marginal utility of wealth  is irrelevant in laboratory 
experiments  raises  questions  about  interpreting  experimental  tests  of  the  adequacy of  expected- 
utility theory. For instance, while  showing that existing alternative models  better  fit experimental 
data than does expected-utility theory, Harless and Camerer (1994) show that expected-utility theory 
better  fits experimental data than does  "expected-value theory"-risk-neutral  expected-utility the- 
ory. But because expected-utility theory implies that laboratory subjects should be risk neutral, such 
evidence that expected-utility theory explains behavior better than expected-value theory is evidence 
against expected-utility theory. 
10 Indeed, Kandel and Stambaugh (1991, pp. 68-69)  discuss how the plausibility of estimates for 
the  coefficient  of  relative risk aversion may be very sensitive to the  scale  of  risk being examined. 
Assuming constant risk aversion, they illustrate how a coefficient of relative risk aversion needed  to 
avoid predicting absurdly large aversion to  a 50/50  lose  $25,000/gain  $25,000 gamble  generates 
absurdly little aversion to a 50/50  lose  $400/gain  $400 gamble. They summarize such examples as 
saying that  "Inferences  about  [the  coefficient  of  relative  risk aversion] are perhaps most  elusive 
when pursued in the introspective context of thought experiments." But precisely the same problem 
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Yet virtually  everybody  would  find  the aggregated  gamble  of 100 50-50  lose $100/gain 
$200 bets attractive.  It has an expected  yield of $5,000,  with negligible  risk:  There is only 
a (1/700) chance of losing any money and merely a (1/25,000) chance of losing more 
than $1,000.11  While nobody would turn down this gamble, many people, such as 
Samuelson's  colleague,  might reject the single 50-50 lose $100/gain $200 bet.12  Hence, 
using expected-utility  theory to make inferences about the risk attitudes towards  the 
amalgamated  bet from  the reaction  to the one bet-or  vice versa-would be misleading. 
What does explain risk aversion over modest stakes? While this paper provides a 
"proof by calibration"  that expected-utility  theory does not help explain some risk 
attitudes,  there are of course more direct tests showing  that alternative  models better 
capture  risk  attitudes.  There  is a large  literature  (see Machina  (1987)  and Camerer  (1992) 
for reviews)  of formal  models  of such alternatives.  Many  of these models  seem to provide 
a more plausible account of modest-scale  risk attitudes,  allowing  both substantial  risk 
aversion over modest stakes and nonridiculous  risk aversion over large stakes, and 
researchers  (e.g., Segal and Spivak  (1990), Loomes and Segal (1994), Epstein and Zin 
(1990)) have explicitly  addressed  how non-expected-utility  theory can help account for 
small-stake  risk aversion. 
Indeed,  what is empirically  the most firmly  established  feature  of risk  preferences,  loss 
aversion,  is a departure  from  expected-utility  theory  that provides  a direct  explanation  for 
modest-scale  risk  aversion.  Loss aversion  says  that people are significantly  more averse  to 
losses relative  to the status  quo than they are attracted  by gains,  and more generally  that 
people's utilities are determined  by changes in wealth rather than absolute levels.13 
Preferences  incorporating  loss aversion  can reconcile  significant  small-scale  risk  aversion 
with reasonable degrees of large-scale risk aversion.14  A  loss-averse person will, for 
instance,  be likely  to turn down  the one 50/50 lose $100/gain $200 gamble  Samuelson's 
colleague  turned  down,  but will surely  accept  one hundred  such gambles  poolec together. 
Variants of this or other models of risk attitudes can provide useful alternatives  to 
11 The  theorem  in  this  paper  predicts  that,  under  exactly  the  same  assumptions  invoked  by 
Samuelson, turning down a 50-50 lose $100/gain  $200 gamble implies the person turns down a 50-50 
lose  $200/gain  $20,000 gamble. This has an expected return of $9,900-with  zero chance of losing 
more than $200. 
12As  Samuelson noted, the  strong statement  that somebody should turn down the many bets if 
and only if she turns down the one is not strictly true if a person's risk attitudes change at different 
wealth levels. Indeed, many researchers (e.g., Hellwig (1995) and Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987)) have 
explored  features  of  the  utility  function  such  that  an  expected-utility  maximizer might  take  a 
multiple of a favorable bet that they would turn down in isolation. But characterizing such instances 
isn't relevant to examples of the  sort discussed by Samuelson. We know from the unwillingness to 
accept a 50/50  lose  $100/gain  $200 gamble that Samuelson's colleague was not an expected-utility 
maximizer. 
13 Loss  aversion was introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)  as part of the  more general 
'prospect theory," and is reviewed in Kahneman, Knetch, and Thaler (1991). Tversky and Kahne- 
man (1991) and others have estimated the loss-aversion-to-gain-attraction ratio to be about 2:1. 
14 While  most  formal definitions  of  loss  aversion have  not  made  explicit  the  assumption  that 
people are substantially risk averse even for very small risks (but see Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin 
(1999) for an explicit treatment of this issue), most examples and calibrations of loss aversion imply 
such small-scale risk aversion. RISK  AVERSION  1289 
expected-utility  theory that can reconcile plausible  risk attitudes  over large stakes with 
nontrivial  risk aversion  over modest stakes.15 
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APPENDIX:  THE  THEOREM  AND  A  COROLLARY 
THEOREM: Suppose  that  for all w, U(w) is strictly  increasing  and weakly  concave.  Suppose  that  there 
exists w > w,  g > l > 0,  such  that for  all  w E [w, w],  .5U(w -  1) + .5U(w + g)  <  U(w).  Then for  all 
w E [w, -], for all x > 0, 
(i)  if g < 21, then 
k*(vx)  i- 
2 k?(g)lr(w)  if  w-w+212x>21, 
i=l1 
k*6Ao- w +21)  i- 
U(w)  -  U(w -x)  ?  2 [w)  (g)  (w) 
+[x-(w-w+  j)])  r(w)  if  x2w-w+21; 
(ii) 
[  E  (-) r(w)  if  x<w-w, 
U(W +x)  -  U(W)  <  ?  k  i 
{k  jE  W  (  W)I()  ? [x  W-I  (  t)r(w)  if  x2w-w, 
where,  letting  int(y) denote  the smallest  integer  less than or equal  to y, k*(x)  int(x/21), k**(x) 
int((x/g)  + 1), and r(w)  U(w) -  U(w - 1). 
15 But Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), Benartzi and Thaler (1995), and Read, Loewenstein,  and 
Rabin (1999) argue that an additional departure from standard assumptions implicated in many risk 
attitudes is that people  tend to isolate  different risky choices  from each other in ways that lead to 
different behavior than would ensue if these risks were considered jointly. Samuelson's colleague, for 
instance,  might  reject  each  50/50  lose  $100/gain  $200  gamble  if  on  each  of  100 days he  were 
offered one such gamble, whereas he might accept all of these gambles if they were offered to him at 
once.  Benartzi  and Thaler  (1995)  argue  that  a  related  type  of  myopia is  an  explanation  for  the 
"equity premium puzzle"-the  mystery about the curiously large premium on returns that investors 
seem  to demand to compensate  for riskiness associated with investing in stocks. Such risk aversion 
can be  explained with plausible (loss-averse) preferences-if  investors are assumed to assess gains 
and losses over a short-run (yearly) horizon rather than the longer-term horizon for which they are 
actually investing. 1290  MATTHEW RABIN 
PROOF  OF  PART  (i)  OF  THEOREM: For  notational  ease  and  without  loss  of  generality,  let 
r(w) -= U(w) -  U(w -  1) =  1. Then  clearly  U(w -  1) -  U(w  -  21) 2  1, by  the  concavity  of  U().  Also, 
since 21 > g > 1, we know that w -  21 + g E (w -  1,  w), and by the concavity of  UQ-)  we know that 
g -1  g 
U(w -  21 +g)  -  U(w -  1)  1 
Hence, 
U(w-21+g)  -  U(w-21)  >  - 11 +=  ~1I 
Hence,  if  w -  21>  w, we  know  that  U(w  -  21) -  U(w -  31) 2 (g/l)  since  by  assumption,  U(w  - 
21 -1)  + U(w -  21 + g) < 2u(w -  21).  By  concavity, we  also  know  that  U(w -  31) -  U(w -  41) 2 
(g/l).  More generally, if  w -  2kl 2 w, then 
U(w  -  (2k  -  1)1)  -  U(w  -  2kl)  ?  U(w  -  2(k  -  1)1)  -  U(w  -  (2k  -  1)1) 
U(w  -  2kl  +g)  -  U(w  -  2kl)  - 
9 
[U(w  -  2(k  -  1)1)  -  U(w  -  (2k  -  1)1)]  ~1 
U(w  -  2kl)  -  U(w  -  (2k  +  11))>  - [U(w  -  2(k  -  1)1)  -  U(w  -  (2k  -  1)1)].  ~1 
These lower bounds on marginal utilities yield the lower bound on total utilities U(w) -  U(w -  x) 
in part (i) of the Theorem.16 
PROOF OF PART (ii)  OF  THEOREM:  Again let  r(w)  U(w) -  U(w -1)  = 1. Then  U(w + g)  -  U(w) 
<1.  By  the  concavity  of  U,  U(w+g)-U(w+g-1)<(l/g).  But  if  w+g<w,  this  implies  by 
assumption that U(w + 2g)  -  U(w + g) < (l/g)  (since  U(w + g -1)  + U(w + 2g)  < 2U(w + g)). 
More generally, we know that if  w + mg < w-,  then 
U(w  + mg  +g)  -  U(w  +  mg)  2  (1/g)[U(w  + mg)  -  U(w  + mg  -g)]. 
These upper bounds on marginal utilities yield the upper bound on utilities U(w + x) -  U(w) in part 
(ii) of the Theorem. 
16 The theorem is weaker than it could be. If we observe, for all m such that 2 < m < w -  w-  + 1, 
that 
U(w  -  m)  -  U(w  -  m  -1)  2  U(w  -  m  +  1)  -  U(w  -  m) 
+ (  -  1) [U(w-m  + 2)-U(w  -m  + 1)], 
we can prove a stronger (but far messier) theorem. (The current theorem merely invokes U(w -  m) 
-  U(w  -  m  -  1) ?  U(w  -  m  +  1) -  U(w  -  m)  for  even  m's.) RISK AVERSION  1291 
COROLLARY:  SUppose that for all w, U(w)  is strictly  increasing and weakly concave. Suppose there 
exists  g > I > 0 such that, for all w, .5U(w -  1) + .5U(w + g) < U(w). Then  for all positive integers  k, for 
all m < m(k),  .5(w -  2kl) + .5U(w + mg) <  U(w), where 
l[1  -  -  :  ,)?  (gI)i]  lk  E(gi  g 
PROOF OF COROLLARY:  From the proof of the Theorem, we know 
U(w)-U(w-2k1)?2E<()  r(w)  and  U(w+mg)-U(w)<?E(-)r(w). 
Therefore, if U(w) -  U(w -  2kl)  < U(w ? mg) -  U(w), then 
2k ( g ) i-l  m + 1  (iz  )  i 
Solving for m yields the formula. Note that if g>  21,  we only need U(w) -  U(w -  2kl) 2 2k(U(w)  - 
U(wT  -  1  if  to get the result. 
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